She was hired in 2018. She started stealing in April 2019. She was not caught until March 2025.

Nearly six years. One employee. $642,013.90 gone from a mechanical services contractor in Eugene, Oregon.

In March 2026, a Lane County judge sentenced Melisa Ann Juline Jaragosky to 96 months in prison plus two years of post-prison supervision after she pled guilty to 14 counts of aggravated identity theft and seven counts of first-degree aggravated theft. The method was not sophisticated. She wrote checks to herself on the company account and forged the signatures of her supervisor and the business owners to cash them. The money financed a home, two cars, and gifts to family and friends.

Here is why this matters beyond one Oregon courtroom. The ACFE’s Occupational Fraud 2026: A Report to the Nations analyzed 2,402 cases across 143 countries totaling more than $3.4 billion in losses. The median case cost $104,000 and ran 12 months before discovery. This one ran roughly six times longer and cost six times more.

And the report’s most uncomfortable finding for readers of this post: small businesses suffer the highest median losses of any organization size. Not because fraudsters prefer them. Because small businesses have the fewest controls standing in the way.

Why Small Businesses Absorb the Biggest Losses

The math is structural, not moral.

A 500-person company has an accounts payable clerk, a controller, a CFO, and an external auditor. A 40-person contractor has one person who “handles the books.” That person often opens the mail, enters the invoices, prints the checks, reconciles the bank statement, and files the paperwork.

That is not a staffing decision. That is the fraud.

The ACFE’s 2026 data makes the gap explicit: 85 percent of large organizations have an established whistleblower reporting mechanism, compared with only 25 percent of small businesses. Since tips remain the single most common way occupational fraud is discovered by a wide margin over any other method, small businesses have effectively removed their best detection tool.

Organizations without a reporting hotline experienced a median loss of $150,000 and took 17 months to detect fraud, versus significantly lower losses and faster detection for those with one. The report’s velocity analysis puts the cost of delay at roughly $9,400 per month for every month a scheme continues undetected.

Run that against six years. The arithmetic is brutal and it is exactly what happened at Harvey and Price.

What the Jaragosky Case Actually Reveals

Strip away the headline number and four specific control failures emerge. Each one is common. Each one is fixable.

Check-signing authority was not verifiable. Forged signatures worked repeatedly over six years, which means nobody downstream was comparing signatures against an authorized signer list, and the bank had no positive pay arrangement flagging checks the company had not issued.

Bank reconciliation was performed by the same person writing the checks. This is the single most important segregation-of-duties failure in small business fraud. If the person who can disburse funds is also the person who confirms the bank balance is correct, there is no control at all — just a report the fraudster writes about herself.

Payee review was absent. Checks written to an employee’s own name are among the easiest anomalies to catch through basic data analytics. Nobody was looking.

Pre-employment screening gaps. State records show Jaragosky previously held a certified nursing assistant license that was revoked in 2008 following an abuse finding by the Oregon Department of Human Services. Background screening scope matters, a check limited to criminal convictions in one county would miss a professional licensing action entirely.

None of these required a forensic accountant to spot. They required someone to look.

The Red Flags That Were Probably Visible

The ACFE consistently finds that fraudsters displaying at least one behavioral red flag cause higher median losses than those displaying none. The 2026 report identifies excessive internal pressure as the flag associated with the highest median loss at $532,000.

In this case, stolen funds financed a home and two vehicles. That is textbook living beyond apparent means, and it is one of the most reliably observable indicators in occupational fraud.

Behavioral indicators worth training managers to notice:

• Lifestyle visibly inconsistent with known salary
• Reluctance to take vacation or allow anyone to cover their duties
• Defensiveness or irritation when asked routine questions about transactions
• Unusually close, unmonitored relationships with vendors
• Consistent refusal to share access, passwords, or documentation
• Financial stress signals such as garnishments or collection calls

Behavioral flags are not evidence and should never be treated as accusations. They are signals to strengthen verification, not grounds for confrontation.

Controls You Can Implement in the Next 30 Days

You do not need enterprise software or a compliance department. You need separation and visibility.

Week one:

• Remove check-signing authority from anyone who enters invoices or reconciles accounts
• Set up bank alerts on all disbursements above a defined threshold, routed to an owner
• Require dual signatures above a dollar limit that actually stings

Week two:

• Have an owner, board member, or outside accountant receive bank statements unopened and review them before they reach the bookkeeper
• Enable positive pay through your bank so unissued check numbers are automatically rejected
• Establish a vendor master file that only an owner can modify

Week three:

• Launch an anonymous reporting channel, a third-party hotline, a dedicated email routed outside finance, or a simple web form. Given the 25 percent adoption rate among small businesses, this is your highest-leverage single move.
• Communicate it clearly to every employee, including that retaliation is prohibited

Week four:

• Implement mandatory vacation of at least five consecutive business days for anyone with financial authority, with duties genuinely covered by someone else
• Run a payee analysis: export 24 months of disbursements and flag any payee matching an employee name, address, or bank account
• Schedule an annual independent review even if you are not required to have one

When to Call an Investigator, and What Not to Do First

If something surfaces, the instinct is to confront the person immediately. Resist it. Premature confrontation destroys evidence, triggers document deletion, and can compromise both civil recovery and criminal prosecution.

A defensible investigation sequence looks like this:

1. Preserve first. Secure system access logs, email, accounting data backups, and physical documents before anyone knows an inquiry is underway.
2. Restrict quietly. Adjust access rights through routine-looking administrative changes where possible.
3. Engage counsel early. Legal privilege considerations shape how the investigation should be structured from day one.
4. Bring in independent expertise. Internal staff investigating a colleague creates bias exposure that opposing counsel will attack.
5. Document the methodology, not just the findings. Restitution orders and insurance claims turn on whether your process holds up under scrutiny.

Jaragosky was ordered to pay full restitution of $642,013.90. Whether a company actually recovers on such an order depends heavily on evidence quality, asset tracing, fidelity bond coverage, and how quickly the investigation moved. Documentation determines recovery.

The Real Lesson

The uncomfortable truth in this case is not that a trusted employee stole. It is that the theft was ordinary in method and extraordinary only in duration.

Six years is not a detection failure. It is the absence of a detection function.

Every organization loses an estimated five percent of annual revenue to occupational fraud each year. For a contractor doing $10 million in revenue, that is $500,000 annually — money that never appears as a line item because nobody is looking for it.

Trust is not a control. Controls are what allow you to keep trusting people, because they remove the opportunity that turns pressure and rationalization into action.

FraudOrder helps organizations assess control gaps, build practical anti-fraud programs, and conduct independent investigations when something surfaces. If reading this case made you think about one person in your own organization who has too much unchecked authority, that instinct is worth acting on before it becomes a sentencing hearing. Visit FraudOrder.co to start a conversation.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. Our bookkeeper has been with us for years and we trust them completely. Isn’t this overkill?

Jaragosky was described by her employer’s office manager as a trusted employee of six years. Long tenure is not a protective factor, the ACFE consistently finds that longer-tenured employees cause higher median losses because they have accumulated more access and less oversight. Controls are not an accusation; they protect honest employees from suspicion just as much as they deter dishonest ones.

2. We’re too small to segregate duties. What’s the minimum viable control?

If you can only do one thing, have an owner personally receive and review unopened bank statements and canceled check images monthly. If you can do two, add an anonymous reporting channel. Neither requires additional headcount, and both directly address the failures that allowed this scheme to run for six years.

3. How much does occupational fraud actually cost a typical organization?

The ACFE estimates organizations lose roughly five percent of annual revenue to fraud each year, with a median case loss of $104,000 in the 2026 report. Small businesses record the highest median losses of any size category. The figure is conservative because it excludes undetected schemes and indirect costs like reputational damage and lost productivity.

4. Will our insurance cover employee theft? Fidelity bonds and commercial crime policies often cover employee dishonesty, but coverage varies substantially and most policies impose strict notice deadlines and documentation requirements. Review your actual policy language now rather than after an incident. Insurers frequently require evidence that reasonable internal controls existed, which makes control documentation part of your coverage strategy.

5. Should we handle an internal investigation ourselves to keep it quiet?

Internal-only investigations create real risk: bias exposure, evidence handling errors, privilege waiver, and employment law claims if the process is procedurally flawed. Discretion is legitimate and achievable with outside professionals, who typically operate more quietly than an internal inquiry that colleagues notice. Engage legal counsel before you begin, not after.

6. What should we do first if we suspect fraud right now?

Preserve evidence before doing anything else, secure accounting backups, email, and system access logs. Do not confront the individual, do not delete or alter records, and do not discuss it broadly internally. Contact legal counsel and an independent investigator to structure the inquiry properly from the outset.

References

1. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2026). Occupational Fraud 2026: A Report to the Nations. https://www.acfe.com/fraud-resources/report-to-the-nations
2. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2026). Key Findings: Report to the Nations 2026. https://www.acfe.com/acfe-insights-blog/blog-detail?s=key-findings-report-to-the-nations-2026
3. KLCC. (2026). Woman sentenced for embezzlement at Eugene contractor. https://www.klcc.org/news-briefs/2026-03-12/woman-sentenced-for-embezzlement-at-eugene-contractor
4. NBC16. (2026). Eugene contractor accountant gets 96 months for $642,000 embezzlement, DA says. https://nbc16.com/news/local/eugene-lane-county-oregon-contractor-accountant-gets-96-months-for-642000-embezzlement-da-says
5. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2026). White-Collar Crime. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime
6. U.S. Small Business Administration. (2025). Protect Your Business from Fraud. https://www.sba.gov/business-guide/manage-your-business/stay-legally-compliant
7. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. (2025). Forensic and Valuation Services. https://www.aicpa-cima.com/topic/forensic-valuation
8. Institute of Internal Auditors. (2025). Fraud and Internal Audit. https://www.theiia.org/en/resources/
9. Federal Trade Commission. (2025). Protecting Small Businesses. https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/small-businesses
10. U.S. Department of Justice. (2025). Fraud Section. https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-fraud

Disclaimer: This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, accounting, or professional advice. Reading this content does not create a client relationship with FraudOrder or any of its professionals. Case details are drawn from publicly reported sources and court information as of publication; readers should consult qualified legal, accounting, and investigative professionals regarding their specific circumstances.

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